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Abstract 
This study integrates research on managerial discretion within the behavioral theory of the firm to examine how 
four CEO psychological traits serving as antecedents of managerial discretion—ambiguity tolerance, cognitive 
complexity, locus of control, and commitment to the status quo—moderate firm responses to poor performance. 
Using CEOs’ responses to questionnaires, CEO ambiguity tolerance is found to positively moderate the 
relationship between negative attainment discrepancy and strategic change when performance is slightly below 
aspirations, defined as average market return for the firm’s industry. Further, CEOs with greater cognitive 
complexity are found to engage in more strategic change when performance is farther below aspirations. Thus, 
this study begins to unpack the role of CEOs’ cognitive makeup on firm responses to performance shortfalls. 
Keywords  
ambiguity tolerance, CEO psychological traits, cognitive complexity, negative attainment discrepancy, strategic 
change 
Introduction 
One of the key theories in strategic management that focuses on firm risk taking and strategic change is the 
behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF) (Cyert and March, 1963). At its core, it is a theory of performance feedback 
that serves as an important driver of managerial decisions. In particular, managers assess their firm’s 
performance relative to a predetermined aspiration level and act accordingly. When current performance falls 
below aspirations, managers are faced with a negative attainment discrepancy and begin problemistic search for 
solutions to close the performance gap (Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 2003). As performance further deteriorates, 
managers are more likely to deviate from the status quo and undertake strategic change with the hopes of 
bringing the firm back to its predetermined aspiration levels. There is ample evidence from prior research that 
negative attainment discrepancy encourages various risky activities, such as research and development (R&D) 
initiatives (Greve, 2003), partnership ties (Shipilov et al., 2011), foreign market entry (Shapira, 2017), and risk 
taking (Lim and McCann, 2014). 
An implicit assumption in performance feedback research has been that poor performance automatically drives 
strategic change and scholars have almost taken it for granted that performance below aspirations is sufficient 
to trigger a firm response. As a result, managers have been viewed as equally capable of responding to negative 
attainment discrepancy and their role in performance feedback has been overlooked. However, such an 
approach conflicts with the managerial discretion literature which posits that managers differ in their level of 
control over conceiving, deliberating, planning, and implementing strategic actions (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 
1987). With greater discretion, managers are more able to recognize the need for change and implement the 
necessary actions for such change (see Wangrow et al., 2015, for review). 
To address this gap in performance feedback research—that managers differ in their ability to pursue strategic 
change in response to poor performance—this study integrates managerial discretion theorizing with the BTOF. 
To that end, this study is designed to examine how the four psychological traits (i.e. ambiguity 
tolerance, cognitive complexity, locus of control, and commitment to the status quo (CSQ)) identified 
by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) to impact managerial discretion affect his or her ability to implement 
strategic actions in response to poor performance. Examining the moderating effects of these four psychological 
traits goes beyond the traditional use of demographic indicators and addresses the call to peer into the real 
psychological processes that drive executive behavior (see Hambrick, 2007; Lawrence, 1997). 
This study seeks to make several contributions. First, integrating managerial discretion into the BTOF and 
examining the impact of CEO psychological traits on firm responses to performance cues address a relatively 
overlooked element in performance feedback research—the role of the executive in driving strategic change 
following poor performance. Thus, this study responds to calls for greater attention to the human element in 
BTOF research and its essential role in firm responses to performance cues (Gavetti et al., 2007). The second 
contribution is extending the BTOF towards a contingency view of performance feedback. While studies have 
examined how industry-level (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003) and firm-level factors (Audia and Greve, 2006; Lim 
and McCann, 2014) moderate the relationship between poor performance and strategic change, this study 
focuses on characteristics residing at the individual level of analysis. Third, by examining the moderating effects 
of four important psychological traits on the relationship between poor performance and strategic change, 
managerial discretion research is extended into the “black box” of executive behavior. In doing so, this study 
considers not only how these psychological traits influence strategic responses to poor performance, but which 
traits may be associated with more rapid responses when performance falls just below aspirations and which 
traits may be associated with more extensive strategic change when performance is far below aspirations. 
Literature review and development of hypotheses 
Researchers have argued that organizations in uncertain environments respond by making decisions based on 
their prior history (Cyert and March, 1963; Levitt and March, 1988). This has led to an interest in how 
organizational characteristics and history determine the likelihood of strategic change under conditions of 
uncertainty (Levinthal and March, 1993; Miller and Chen, 1994; Greve, 2003). Cyert and March’s 
(1963) influential BTOF was one of the first theoretical underpinnings to make predictions on when 
organizations are likely to make changes. A primary tenet of BTOF is problemistic search, which is initiated when 
the organization performs poorly and, thus, makes change more likely. In essence, the theory argues that poor 
performance serves as a catalyst to search for solutions and stimulates managers to break away from 
established organizational routines (Bromiley, 2005). As performance falls farther below aspiration levels, firms 
are faced with a greater necessity to undertake strategic change that could address performance shortfalls. For 
example, Greve (2003) finds that when performance falls below aspirations, firms are more likely to pursue R&D 
activities. Similarly, Baum and colleagues (2005) provide further support by showing that poor performance 
triggers the search for new partnerships in the banking industry. Other studies have also found that negative 
attainment discrepancy results in more strategic change in the form of risk taking (Lim and McCann, 2014), 
foreign market entry (Ref and Shapira, 2017), and divestitures (Kuusela et al., 2017). Consistent with these 
studies, a baseline hypothesis associated with negative attainment discrepancy and strategic change is 
developed. Formally stated: 
Baseline hypothesis: Negative attainment discrepancy leads to greater strategic change. 
Strategic change is fundamental in aligning the firm with its environment (Andrews, 1971) and represents a 
major source of firm survival (Carpenter, 2000), but it is also inherently uncertain and complex. Thus, its 
implementation is dependent on how executives perceive strategic change and whether they view it as a viable 
means to address their firm’s problems. Prior research in the BTOF tradition has primarily focused on how 
negative attainment discrepancy impacts strategic change but pays little attention to the role of firm executives 
in that process, as well as whether executives with various cognitions, experiences, and risk preferences respond 
differently to poor performance. Examining the role of executives’ psychological traits in the relationship 
between performance and action addresses this omission in prior research. Indeed, according to Gavetti et al., 
(2007: 10) “the recent and growing movement in strategy research…pursues an agenda in which the construct 
of cognitive representation plays a pivotal role.” 
While the basic argument in this study is developed from the premise that executives respond to performance 
shortfalls, it is rather simplistic to expect a similar response by all executives. Prior research has shown that not 
all executives have the same level of discretion to pursue strategic choices and, thus, have latitudes of action 
that can vary greatly (e.g. Crossland et al., 2014; Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995; Key, 2002). Hambrick and 
Finkelstein asserted that managerial discretion is determined by three forces: the task environment, the internal 
firm context, and the executive’s personal characteristics. For example, scholars have found that greater 
industry growth, munificence, and dynamism lead to greater managerial discretion (Hambrick and Abrahamson, 
1995). In contrast, more industry regulation and concentration limit the latitude of action available to firm 
executives (Porter, 1980; Thompson, 1967). Furthermore, theory and prior evidence suggest that while larger, 
older, and more capital-intensive firms restrict managerial discretion (Hambrick and Macmillan, 1985; Hannan 
and Freeman, 1977), greater firm resources and organizational slack serve to enhance executives’ latitude of 
action (Barker and Duhaime, 1997; Cyert and March, 1963). 
There are several reasons for examining executives’ individual characteristics that affect managerial discretion. 
First, a greater understanding of the role of the human element in firm responses to performance cues is 
needed. Upper echelons theory holds that top managers, based on their own set of cognitions and experiences, 
make choices and decisions that shape a firm’s competitive posture (Carpenter, 2002; Hambrick and Mason, 
1984). Hence, their cognitive makeup will also play a role in implementing strategic change. Focusing on these 
individual-level characteristics, rather than industry-level or organizational-level characteristics, enables a look 
into the remaining black box in current theoretical models. In addition, there has been a lack of agreement on 
the measurement and construct validity of managerial discretion when generalizations about the task 
environment or internal organization are used to measure managerial discretion (c.f. Wangrow et al., 2015). This 
study avoids such issues by relying directly on observable and validated measures of the four psychological traits 
posited by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) to serve as antecedents of managerial discretion. Furthermore, 
focusing on individual characteristics that determine managerial discretion facilitates a more intimate 
examination of executives’ cognitions and behaviors when faced with performance shortfalls in their firms 
(e.g. Hambrick et al., 2005). 
The model developed in this study focuses on the moderating effects of four important and minimally examined 
individual traits on the relationship of negative attainment discrepancy and strategic change. Consistent with 
the psychology literature on ambiguity tolerance (see Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; McLain, 2009), CEOs who tolerate 
ambiguity are expected to be more proactive and open to experimentation, suggesting that they would drive 
more immediate change in response to poor performance. Similarly, CEOs who possess greater cognitive 
complexity are expected to comprehend and integrate more frameworks when making decisions (McGill et al., 
1994; Van Seggelen-Damen, 2013) and be better equipped to adapt to environmental changes (Bogner and Barr, 
2000). Thus, when necessary, CEOs with greater cognitive complexity are expected to drive broader and more 
extensive strategic change. Additionally, CEOs with a more internal locus of control (see Hodgkinson, 
1992; Rotter, 1966) are expected to feel that their decisions and actions have a greater impact on reversing poor 
performance than CEOs with a more external locus of control (Judge et al., 1999) and, thus, are expected to 
drive greater strategic change following performance shortfalls. Finally, CEOs who are committed to the status 
quo, embodied in psychological investments to the current state of affairs (Hambrick et al., 1993; Musteen et al., 
2006), are expected to be reluctant to initiate and promote strategic change when performance is below 
aspirations. 
Ambiguity tolerance and firm responses to performance shortfalls 
The ambiguity tolerance construct developed by Frenkel-Brunswick (1949) contains many behavioral traits 
associated with proactive behavior, including the ability to reverse decisions and courses of action when 
conditions vary, the avoidance of prematurely selecting solutions in unclear situations, and an open-mindedness 
toward unfamiliar and unexpected environmental changes (Furnham and Marks, 2013; McLain, 2009). Budner 
(1962) defined ambiguity tolerance as an individual’s propensity to view ambiguous situations as 
nonthreatening and desirable, suggesting that ambiguous situations can be novel (i.e. situations with no familiar 
patterns) or complex (i.e. overly complex situations with too many patterns). A person with greater ambiguity 
tolerance perceives uncertain and complex situations as interesting and exciting, tends to think creatively, and 
approaches problems proactively with innovative perspectives (McLain, 2009). 
Researchers have previously linked ambiguity tolerance with the ability to simultaneously manage multiple 
frameworks, arguing that the ability to do so encourages strategic thinking and improves overall decision-
making (Bonn, 2005; Starbuck and Milliken, 1988). Additionally, Graetz’s (2002) study of a firm’s future leaders 
found that ambiguity tolerance was associated with the abilities to conceptualize a variety of ideas and 
synthesize proposals from multiple perspectives. 
From theory and prior research, CEOs with greater ambiguity tolerance are expected to have a proactive bias in 
driving strategic change when performance is poor. Since they are not threatened by uncertain and challenging 
situations, such as deteriorating performance, these CEOs display a willingness to accept and endorse 
alternative courses of action, are capable of devising effective solutions to problems, and are better equipped to 
deal with the challenges associated with strategic change. In addition, such CEOs would be more likely to 
challenge comforting, but sometimes unrealistic, interpretations of firm performance held by the board or top 
management team (Drummond, 2015). These arguments extend previous research that has found a strong 
negative association between ambiguity tolerance and resistance to change (e.g. Oreg, 2003). Similarly, Judge et 
al. (1999) found that ambiguity tolerance was among the two psychological traits most strongly associated with 
executives’ ability to cope with change. Indeed, while CEOs less tolerant of ambiguity may wait for significant 
performance drops before initiating changes, CEOs with higher ambiguity tolerance will be more likely to initiate 
change once firm performance dips below aspirations. 
H1: Ambiguity tolerance will moderate the relationship between negative attainment discrepancy and 
strategic change, such that CEOs with higher ambiguity tolerance will initiate greater strategic change 
when performance is slightly below aspirations. 
Cognitive complexity and firm responses to performance shortfalls 
Prior literature considers that cognitively complex executives are able to envision and execute a wider set of 
possible actions because they are minimally constrained by their intellectual aptitude, critical thinking skills, and 
perceptive abilities. Cognitive complexity suggests an executive’s capacity to seek, differentiate, and integrate 
information (Hogarth, 1980); consider abstract ideas (Neuliep and Hazelton, 1986); and recognize and 
comprehend a wider range of perspectives when making decisions (McGill et al., 1994; Van Seggelen-Damen, 
2013). Scholars have argued that cognitively complex executives excel at strategic planning and formulation 
because they can adapt to changing environments by continually filtering and processing new information and 
reevaluating goals and strategies (Hambrick et al., 1996; McGill et al., 1994). This ability to draw on an extensive 
range of information and personal evaluation skills, as well as greater information processing skills, has been 
shown to be positively associated with strategic thinking. Outcomes from strategic thinking associated with 
cognitive complexity include speedier and higher quality evaluation of options during strategic or operational 
planning (Hitt and Tyler, 1991), increased speed and quality for acquisition decisions (Wally and Baum, 1994), 
and a leader’s performance relative to innovation (Halbesleben et al., 2003; Zander and Kogut, 1995). Indeed, 
recent research has shown that cognitive complexity is one of the most critical personal competencies necessary 
for implementing strategic change (Crossland et al., 2014) and sustaining higher performance in dynamic 
environments (Latukha and Panibratov, 2015). 
This study extends previous theory and research that links cognitive complexity and proactive behavior by 
arguing that, in cases of poor performance, cognitively complex CEOs will be better suited to comprehend 
changes in the internal and external environment and, in turn, be able to conceptualize and drive the necessary 
changes in their firm’s strategies and actions. CEOs’ proactive behavior will be driven by an honest and more 
accurate assessment of current strategies and a deeper understanding of their firm’s businesses and how 
various internal functions are associated with current strategies and serving customers’ needs. 
H2: Cognitive complexity will moderate the relationship between negative attainment discrepancy and 
strategic change, such that CEOs with greater cognitive complexity will initiate greater strategic change 
when performance falls farther below aspirations. 
Locus of control and firm responses to performance shortfalls 
Levenson (1974) refers to locus of control as the ability of individuals to differentiate between internality, 
powerful others, and external events, while Rotter (1966) and Judge et al. (1999) assert that locus of control is 
an individual’s perception of his or her ability to exercise control over the environment. People who believe that 
their knowledge, skills, abilities, and actions have a strong influence on outcomes in their personal and 
professional lives are “internals.” Conversely, those who believe that outcomes in their personal and 
professional lives are controlled by forces beyond their control are considered “externals” (Hodgkinson, 1992). 
Scholars have found positive relationships for CEOs having an internal locus of control with firm performance 
(Boone et al., 1996) and with developing their staff and inspiring them to accept a higher collective purpose 
(Howell and Avolio, 1993). Similarly, evidence suggests that “internal” CEOs take greater risks, pursue more 
innovation, and are less likely to imitate competitors (Miller et al., 1982) and that locus of control moderates the 
relationship between experience and decision maker uncertainty (Ashill and Jobber, 2013). 
CEOs with a more internal locus of control, contrary to CEOs who more strongly feel that outcomes from their 
decisions and actions are related to exogenous events (i.e. “externals”), should be more proactive in taking 
actions to address poor performance. Indeed, CEOs with an “internal” predisposition are predicted to have a 
greater sense of urgency to initiate actions when performance is poor and will generate a broader range of 
initiatives to address problems because they feel that the actions they initiate and promote will drive firm 
outcomes. 
H3: Locus of control will moderate the relationship between negative attainment discrepancy and 
strategic change, such that CEOs with a greater internal locus of control will initiate greater strategic 
change when performance falls farther below aspirations. 
CSQ and firm responses to performance shortfalls 
CEOs who are more committed to the status quo have developed psychological investments in the current 
policies of their firm, along with a personal need to adhere to established industry norms (Hambrick et al., 
1993). These psychological investments have previously been found to be caused by functional experience in 
dominant career tracks (Geletkanycz and Black, 2001), CEO industry tenure (Hambrick et al., 1993), and CEO firm 
tenure (Musteen et al., 2006), though mixed results from studies examining the relationship between past firm 
performance and CSQ (see McClelland et al., 2010) suggest that a combination of inertial pressures and 
psychological investments leads to a CEO being more committed to the status quo. CEO CSQ has been found to 
exhibit a positive effect on performance in low discretion industries, while having a negative effect on 
performance in high discretion industries (McClelland et al., 2010). Additionally, scholars have theorized that 
CSQ inhibits organizational evolution (Tushman et al., 1986), with studies showing that, if the CEO is newly 
appointed, CSQ inhibits his or her ability to pursue change (Nakauchi and Wiersema, 2015). As CSQ is an 
enduring and often excessive belief in the firm’s current policies and strategies, the following hypothesis that 
CEOs who are more committed to the status quo will knowingly or unknowingly react less urgently to poor 
performance is offered. 
H4: CSQ will moderate the relationship between negative attainment discrepancy and strategic change, 
such that CEOs who are more committed to the status quo will initiate less strategic change when 
performance falls slightly below aspirations. 
Methods 
Sample 
The sample was drawn from 1017 publicly traded US firms across 28 states1 in which the firm had been in 
existence before 2010 and had 2014 revenue greater than 20 million dollars. These firms operate in a wide 
range of industries, in which there is a substantial variation in competitive dynamics, financial and market 
performance, and life cycle stage. Questionnaires were sent to the 1017 CEOs, asking them to respond to 32 
items associated with ambiguity tolerance, cognitive complexity, locus of control, and CSQ. One hundred seven 
completed questionnaires were received from the CEOs, resulting in a 10.5% response rate that is consistent 
with expected response rates from CEOs of large US firms (Hambrick et al., 1993). Eight of the 107 firms with 
responding CEOs were either acquired, went bankrupt shortly after the response was received, or operated in 
industries in which this study’s dependent variable measure was not appropriate (e.g. banking, insurance). Thus, 
the final sample size was 99 publicly traded US firms. 
The age of the 99 CEOs in the sample ranges from 43 years to 80 years, with an average age of 57.5 years. 
Twenty-one CEOs hold degrees from elite educational institutions,2 while five CEOs are female, 17 CEOs are one 
of their firm’s founders, and four CEOs have family members serving on the top management team. For the 99 
CEOs, the median 2014 current compensation is US$715,000 and their median 2014 total compensation is 
US$2,590,000. The median ratio of CEOs’ current compensation to their firm’s next highest paid executive is 
1.59. 
Dependent variable 
Following prior research, strategic change is measured as the change in six key strategic choice variables: 
advertising intensity; R&D intensity; selling, general and administrative intensity; capital intensity; plant, 
property, and equipment (PP&E) newness; and leverage (Crossland et al., 2014). For each firm in the sample, the 
absolute values of the six strategic choice variables from 2014 to 2015 were calculated. Each strategic choice 
variable was then standardized. The six resulting measures were then averaged, providing a positive value in 
which higher scores indicate greater strategic change. 
Independent variable 
Attainment discrepancy was operationalized as the difference between firm performance in year 2014 and its 
aspiration levels (based on firm performance in year 2013). Performance is based on industry-adjusted market 
return, which is derived by calculating shareholder equity divided by total assets for each firm and then 
subtracting the mean market return of all firms in its industry. Consistent with previous BTOF research that 
examines attainment discrepancies (Greve, 2003; Iyer and Miller, 2008), a spline function was used to create 
positive attainment discrepancy (i.e. market return above aspirations) and negative attainment discrepancy 
(i.e. market return below aspirations). Thus, for positive attainment discrepancy, if industry-adjusted market 
return is greater than zero, then market return above aspirations equals industry-adjusted market return; 
otherwise, market return above aspirations is set to zero. Likewise, for negative attainment discrepancy, if 
industry-adjusted market return is equal to or less than zero, then market return below aspirations equals 
industry-adjusted market return; otherwise, market return below aspirations is set to zero. 
Moderator variables 
Responses from questionnaires were used to develop the measures for the four moderator variables. 
For ambiguity tolerance, CEOs responded to a 13-item five-point Likert-type scale developed by McLain 
(2009) (see Table 1A for a list of the items). In developing his ambiguity tolerance scale, McLain paid close 
attention to how each item was worded, reducing potential confounding influences of references not related to 
the CEOs role. Furnham and Marks (2013) reviewed ambiguity tolerance scales dating back to Budner (1962) and 
recommended using McLain’s scale when participants are less likely to respond to longer scales or may be 
cognitively overloaded. 
The responses from CEOs indicated strong internal consistency (α = 0.84), in line with the internal consistency 
found by McLain during testing with various groups of subjects. Ambiguity tolerance for each responding CEO 
was calculated by adjusting the reverse-coded items and computing the mean of the 13 equally weighted items. 
Since ambiguity tolerance represents a psychological trait that is firmly established by the time executives 
assume the CEO role and, thus, remains stable over time (Judge et al., 2009; Roberts et al., 2006), it is unlikely 
that the current strategic posture and performance of the firm have influenced the CEOs’ responses. 
Cognitive complexity was derived from the number of functions that a CEO reported working in during his or her 
career. Career variety, whether it is defined as firms, industries, or distinct functions in which a CEO has worked 
during his or her career, enables a greater awareness of connections and impacts. Even if the CEO did not 
master a specific function (e.g. accounting, engineering, manufacturing), having worked in that function 
enhances the CEOs ability to conceptualize business situations and promote a wider array of solutions due to a 
more extensive cognitive stock (Crossland et al., 2014; Fiske and Taylor, 2013). Responding CEOs reported 
working in as few as two functions and as many as nine functions during their careers. Because tests for 
skewness and kurtosis revealed a positive skew, the log of reported career functions was used for the cognitive 
complexity measure in the analysis. 
For locus of control, CEOs responded to Hodgkinson’s (1992) established 16-item five-point Likert-type scale 
(see Table 2A for a list of the items). Hodgkinson’s scale is a more strategically oriented locus of control scale 
that is appropriate for studies of executives of for-profit firms because of its context specificity and no 
correlation with social desirability (Hiller and Hambrick, 2005). CEOs’ responses to the 16 items indicated strong 
internal consistency (α = 0.73). Locus of control for each responding CEO was calculated by adjusting the 
reverse-coded items and computing the mean of the 16 equally weighted items. The composite scores ranged 
from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating a more internal locus of control. 
For CSQ, CEOs responded to a single reverse-coded item, “I can tolerate strategic and operational changes that 
are risky if they can potentially improve the performance of our firm,” with scores ranging from 1 to 5 and 
higher scores indicating greater CSQ. 
Control variables 
CEO tenure has been found to be positively associated with CEO influence over firm decisions (Musteen et al., 
2006) and has been argued to be negatively associated with strategic change (Miller, 1991). Thus, CEO tenure, 
measured as the log of the number of years that the CEO has served in his or her role in the firm, was included 
as a control variable. Management scholars have long held the view that as firm size increases, significant 
inertial forces develop within firms (Thompson, 1967). Larger firms are more likely to have extensive 
bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1978) and difficulty implementing change (Aldrich, 2008). Thus, firm size, measured as 
the log of average sales from 2013 to 2015, was included as a control variable. To control for the influence of 
larger institutional shareholders over firm actions, blockholder share, calculated as the total percentage of 
shares held by institutions that own at least five percent of the firm’s outstanding shares, was included in the 
analysis. Additionally, since the volatility of the firm’s industry may influence the degree of strategic change, the 
analysis controlled for industry dynamism. Following the method of Dess and Beard (1984) to measure industry 
dynamism, standard error was calculated from regressing 5 years of annual industry sales on a year counter 
variable. Furthermore, to control for other sources of power and possible mandates for change, whether the 
CEO was also a founder of the firm, held the title of board chairman (i.e. CEO duality), and had joined the firm 
within 12 months of attaining the CEO position (i.e. outsider) were included in the analysis. In each of these 
three cases, the variable was coded as “1” if true for the CEO; otherwise, it was coded as “0.” Finally, consistent 
with prior BTOF research, positive attainment was included as an additional control variable. 
To increase confidence that the results reflect causal relationships, the measurements of all independent and 
control variables are from the year prior to assessing strategic change. 
Analysis 
Methods summarized in Datta (1991) were followed to test for potential nonresponse and late response bias, 
with the results showing no such problems in the sample. Descriptive statistics, including means, standard 
deviations, and correlations, are reported in Table 1. The correlations do not suggest that collinearity is a 
problem, which was verified by determining the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each independent variable. VIF 
did not exceed 1.47 for any independent variable. 
  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations. 
 Mean 
 
Standard 
deviation   
Minim
um   
Maxi
mum 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
1. Strategic 
change 
0.34 0.39 0.00 2.30              
2. CEO tenure 0.79 0.39 0.00 1.51 -0.050             
3. Firm size 8.95 0.59 7.67 10.56 -
0.245*     
-0.134            
4. Founder 0.17 0.38 0 1 0.066 0.449*
*  
-0.155           
5. CEO 
duality 
0.42 0.50 0 1 -0.002 0.381*
* 
-0.020 0.368*
* 
         
6. Outsider 0.37 0.49 0 1 0.143 -0.144 -0.169   -0.186 -0.156         
7. 
Blockholder 
share 
0.35 0.18 0.00 0.84 0.066 -
0.236* 
-0.065 -0.164 -0.084 0.118        
8. Industry 
dynamism 
0.03 0.05 0.00 0.46 -0.040 0.025 0.146 0.003 0.153 -0.057 -0.023       
9. Market 
return above 
aspirations 
0.08 0.11 0.00 -
0.065 
0.084 0.50 -0.143 0.145 0.055 -0.012 -0.088 -0.082      
10. Market 
return below 
aspirations 
-0.06 
 
0.12 
 
-0.70 
 
0.00 
 
-
0.269*
*   
 
-0.059 
 
0.084   
 
-0.010 
 
-0.021   
 
-0.095 
 
-0.163   
 
-0.064 
 
0.365*
* 
    
11. Ambiguity 
tolerance 
 
3.74 
 
0.49 
 
2.54 
 
4.85 
 
0.133 
 
0.029 
 
0.111   
 
-0.099 0.088 
 
0.166 
 
-0.011   
 
-0.041   
 
-0.093 
 
-
0.173 
   
12. Cognitive 
complexity 
 
1.50 
 
0.37 
 
0.69 
 
2.20 
 
0.187 
 
-0.062 
 
-0.040 
 
0.110 
 
0.073 
 
0.231*   
- 
 
0.064 
 
0.012 
 
0.025 
 
0.012   -0.109   
13. Locus of 
control 
 
3.69 
 
0.38 
 
2.69 
 
4.69 
 
-0.106 
 
0.005 
 
0.047   
 
-0.109 -0.035 
 
0.280*
* 
 
0.061 
 
0.047 
 
0.004 
 
0.067 
 
0.301** 
 
0.165  
14. CSQ 1.96 
 
0.79 
 
1.00 
 
5.00 
 
-
0.200*     
-
0.251*     
-0.070   -0.078 
 
-0.137 
 
0.013 
 
0.110   
- 
-0.038 0.072 
 
0.136   -0.351**   0.146   -0.162 
Note: CSQ: commitment to the status quo. N     99. 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
The hypotheses were tested using ordinary least squares regressions, with results from testing the four 
hypotheses shown in Table 2. While no specific problems were seen in the data, robust standard errors were 
used since they offer a more conservative measure of standard errors that can deal more effectively with minor 
problems regarding normality, outliers, and heteroscedasticity (Rousseeuw and Leroy, 2005). Supplementary 
analyses controlled for CEO gender, CEO age, CEO current compensation, and the ratio of CEO current 
compensation to his or her firm’s next highest paid executive. Since those variables were not significant and did 
not change the results, they were not included in Table 2. 
  
Table 2. Analysis using OLS regression. 
Dependent variable: strategic 
change 
          
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
CEO tenure -0.106 
(0.104) 
-0.132 
(0.104) 
-0.139 
(0.103) 
-0.132 
(0.105) 
-0.106 
(0.095) 
-0.185¹ 
(0.105) 
-0.120 
(0.106) 
-0.127 
(0.106) 
-0.186 
(0.114) 
-0.185 
(0.117) 
Firm size -0.147¹ 
(0.087) 
-0.139 
(0.090) 
-0.152 
(0.093) 
-0.145 
(0.090) 
-0.140 
(0.091) 
-0.118 
(0.091) 
-0.133 
(0.084) 
-0.132 
(0.083) 
-0.155¹ 
(0.088) 
-0.154¹ 
(0.088) 
Blockholder share 0.068 
(0.346) 
-0.030 
(0.340) 
-0.017 
(0.340) 
-0.061 
(0.336) 
0.002 
(0.339) 
-0.085 
(0.292) 
-0.016 
(0.341) 
-0.029 
(0.347) 
0.007 
(0.334) 
0.009 
(0.331) 
Industry dynamism 0.099 
(0.188) 
0.100 
(0.188) 
0.117 
(0.188) 
0.102 (0.187) 0.071 
(0.174) 
0.046 
(0.150) 
0.092 
(0.182) 
0.079 
(0.185) 
0.109 
(0.181) 
0.113 
(0.172) 
Founder 0.014 
(0.083) 
0.015 
(0.082) 
0.000 
(0.086) 
0.036 (0.082) 0.002 
(0.079) 
0.066 
(0.078) 
0.015 
(0.082) 
0.023 
(0.079) 
0.004 
(0.079) 
0.003 
(0.081) 
Duality 0.085 
(0.100) 
0.069 
(0.097) 
0.051 
(0.100) 
0.033 (0.099) 0.035 
(0.085) 
0.035 
(0.085) 
0.093 
(0.103) 
0.103 
(0.105) 
0.062 
(0.093) 
0.064 
(0.092) 
Outsider -0.006 
(0.312) 
-0.157 
(0.259) 
-0.075 
(0.328) 
-0.488 
(0.332) 
-0.174 
(0.257) 
-0.255 
(0.263) 
-0.114 
(0.266) 
-0.050 
(0.310) 
-0.152 
(0.269) 
-0.162 
(0.276) 
Market return above 
aspirations 
 -0.038 
(0.266) 
-0.034 
(0.262) 
0.173 (0.273) -0.037 
(0.278) 
0.131 
(0.258) 
-0.042 
(0.271) 
0.025 
(0.278) 
-0.009 
(0.262) 
-0.012 
(0.261) 
Market return below 
aspirations 
 -0.832¹ 
(0.434) 
-0.762 
(0.468) 
-8.132*** 
(2.345) 
-0.842* 
(0.398) 
3.018* 
(1.149) 
-0.795¹ 
(0.463) 
2.339 
(3.037) 
-0.738¹ 
(0.426) 
-0.541 
(1.215) 
Ambiguity tolerance   0.096 
(0.078) 
0.230* 
(0.088) 
      
Cognitive complexity     0.163 
(0.122) 
-0.056 
(0.104) 
    
Locus of control       -0.102 
(0.130) 
-0.174 
(0.157) 
  
CSQ         -0.110* 
(0.053) 
-0.114* 
(0.051) 
Interactions           
Market return below  
aspirations  × Ambiguity 
tolerance 
   1.776** 
(0.524) 
      
Market return below  
aspirations × Cognitive 
complexity 
     -2.794** 
(0.907) 
    
Market return below 
aspirations × Locus of control 
       -0.899 
(0.897) 
  
Market return below  
aspirations x CSQ 
         -0.107 
(0.667) 
Constant 1.665¹ 
(0.851) 
1.611¹ 
(0.878) 
1.375¹ 
(0.783) 
0.791 (0.743) 1.361 
(0.986) 
1.540 
(0.971) 
1.915¹ 
(1.080) 
2.161¹ 
(1.164) 
2.004* 
(0.895) 
2.004* 
(0.898) 
R2 0.084 0.145 0.158 0.226 0.167 0.279 0.154 0.167 0.191 0.191 
Note: CSQ: commitment to the status quo; OLS: ordinary least squares. N     99. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
¹p< 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
 
 
  
Results 
Model 1 shows the results with only the control variables included in the model. Model 2 adds the 
independent variables and models 3 through 10 add the moderating variables and interaction terms. 
The baseline hypothesis that negative attainment discrepancy drives more strategic change is generally 
supported (β = −0.832; p = 0.058 in model 2). Here, a negative coefficient for the independent 
variable, market return below aspirations, indicates that firms engage in strategic change as 
performance deteriorates. 
Hypothesis 1 argued that ambiguity tolerance will moderate the relationship between negative 
attainment discrepancy and strategic change, such that CEOs with higher ambiguity tolerance will 
initiate greater strategic change when performance is slightly below aspirations. As shown in model 4, 
the interaction term of ambiguity tolerance and market return below aspirations is positive and 
significant (p < 0.01), providing support for hypothesis 1. This is further illustrated in Figure 1, which 
shows that CEOs with higher ambiguity tolerance implement greater strategic change when 
performance is slightly below aspirations. CEOs who are less tolerant of ambiguity increase the degree 
of strategic change that they implement as performance deteriorates, with CEOs implementing roughly 
the same degree of strategic change, regardless of their tolerance for ambiguity, when performance is 
far below aspirations. This implies that a CEO with high ambiguity tolerance will react earlier to 
performance downturns, which could be critical to the long-term viability of the firm. Waiting until firm 
performance is significantly below aspirations could put the firm in the vicarious position of being 
unable to pivot to a new course of action before it is too late. 
 
Figure 1. Interaction of ambiguity tolerance with market return below aspirations. 
Hypothesis 2 stated that cognitive complexity will moderate the relationship between negative 
attainment discrepancy and strategic change, such that CEOs with higher cognitive complexity will 
initiate greater strategic change when performance falls farther below aspirations. As shown in model 6, 
the interaction term of cognitive complexity and market return below aspirations is significant (p < 0.01), 
providing support for hypothesis 2. This is further illustrated in Figure 2, which shows that CEOs with 
higher cognitive complexity increase the degree of strategic change that they implement as 
performance worsens, while CEOs with less cognitive complexity implement approximately the same 
degree of strategic change at all levels of performance below aspirations. The results suggest that a 
CEO's cognitive complexity can also be critical to the long-term viability of the firm, but in a different 
way than ambiguity tolerance. While the results suggest that greater ambiguity tolerance increases the 
likelihood of initiating strategic change sooner (i.e. when performance falls slightly below aspirations), 
the results also suggest that CEOs with greater cognitive complexity are more likely to implement broad 
and extensive changes in many strategic dimensions (e.g. advertising, R&D investment, PP&E 
investment, leverage) when performance falls far below aspirations. 
 
Figure 2. Interaction of cognitive complexity with market return below aspirations. 
Hypothesis 3 stated that locus of control will moderate the relationship between negative attainment 
discrepancy and strategic change. As shown in model 8, the interaction term of locus of 
control with market return below aspirations is not significant. Hypothesis 3 is not supported. 
Hypothesis 4 stated that CSQ will moderate the relationship between negative attainment discrepancy 
and strategic change. As shown in model 10, the interaction term of CSQ and market return below 
aspirations is not significant. Hypothesis 4 is not supported. 
Discussion 
This study provides insight into an overlooked element of the BTOF, that of managerial cognitions in 
times of uncertainty (Greve, 2003). Thus, this study builds on BTOF by addressing the role of managerial 
discretion and psychological traits on the relationship between performance and action when the firm is 
performing poorly. In particular, the moderating effects of four psychological traits from Hambrick and 
Finkelstein’s (1987) managerial discretion construct—ambiguity tolerance, cognitive complexity, locus of 
control, and CSQ—on the relationship between negative attainment discrepancy and strategic change 
were examined. The results reveal that specific executive characteristics, which influence the degree of 
discretion displayed by CEOs, are important contingencies to whether and when firms engage in 
strategic change. Thus, this study provides a strong support to the broad field of strategic leadership 
which centers around the idea that careful choice of leaders is critical to firm behaviors. 
The results from testing hypothesis 1 suggest that CEOs with greater ambiguity tolerance are more likely 
to implement changes necessary to prevent further performance erosion. The psychology literature 
posits that individuals with higher ambiguity tolerance are more comfortable with reversing courses of 
action, are less likely to be trapped in maintaining existing routines, and are more open-minded toward 
unfamiliar and unexpected external environmental changes (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; McLain, 2009). 
Additionally, Judge et al., (1999) showed that executives who are more comfortable with ambiguity are 
better able to cope with change. The results from this study suggest that each of these facets of 
ambiguity tolerance may play a role in not only how CEOs interpret situations and implement actions, 
but whether they choose to do so. CEOs who are less tolerant of ambiguity may delay or forego 
evaluating, developing, and implementing alternative strategic directions. 
Further, the results from testing hypothesis 2 show that CEOs with greater cognitive complexity 
implement more substantial changes as performance declines, potentially in a wider range of strategic 
areas than CEOs with lower cognitive complexity. Consistent with the idea of bounded rationality 
(March and Simon, 1958), these results suggest that regardless of the situation’s severity, some CEOs 
might be limited in the degree of change they can undertake because of their knowledge and ability to 
comprehend and adapt to various internal and external conditions. Restrictions on strategic change 
implemented by a CEO with lower cognitive complexity when performance is very poor may be the 
result of a series of additive limitations, since reduced cognitive complexity may constrain a CEOs field of 
vision and cause a CEO to be selective or biased when interpreting information. Additionally, a CEOs 
knowledge of alternatives and consequences of potential alternatives may also be constrained. While a 
few management scholars have examined the relationship of cognitive complexity with strategic 
choices, such as acquisitions (Hitt and Tyler, 1991) and the pace of decision-making (Wally and Baum, 
1994), this study advances prior research by demonstrating that cognitive complexity serves to bolster 
strategic change when performance falls far short of expectations. 
Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) posit that both cognitive complexity and ambiguity tolerance are 
positively related to managerial discretion. In the context of a firm performing below board and 
shareholder aspirations, these findings are consistent with how these two traits function in Hambrick 
and Finkelstein’s managerial characteristics force. These findings, however, also suggest that ambiguity 
tolerance and cognitive complexity are especially valuable in different circumstances. First, consider a 
firm that has consistently met performance expectations, but is currently experiencing a small 
performance decline. A CEO with less ambiguity tolerance might “stay the course.” However, a CEO who 
is more tolerant of ambiguity is far more proactive and takes any necessary steps and makes changes to 
avoid further decline. Second, consider a firm that is performing considerably poorer than other firms in 
its industry. Customers may be dissatisfied and, thus, are switching to other providers, costs may be too 
high due to inefficiencies, and business development opportunities may be forsaken. The necessity for 
change is abundantly clear, but the degree of change necessary for dramatic turnaround requires a CEO 
who can conceptualize the nature of problems in most, if not all, of the firm’s activities. However, 
conceptualization across many areas of the firm is not enough for turnaround. To implement dramatic 
strategic change, the CEO needs to be able to comprehend and accept sweeping changes associated 
with assets, management, and financial restructuring. Stated differently, the firm is better suited with a 
CEO who possesses greater cognitive complexity. 
Given that previous research has found that CEOs with an internal locus of control will feel that their 
actions matter (Judge et al., 1999) and are more likely to trigger improvement and other positive 
outcomes (Anderson and Schneier, 1978; Howell and Avolio, 1993), it was surprising that locus of 
control was not found to have any effect on the relationship of performance below aspirations and 
strategic change. One possible explanation is that more “external” CEOs may have self-selected more 
inertial firms (e.g. older, larger) or slower-paced, less dynamic industries that are more consistent with 
where they fall on the locus of control continuum (Finkelstein et al., 2009). 
While no support was found for the moderating role of CSQ, the results showed a significant negative 
relationship for CSQ with strategic change. This is consistent with Hambrick et al.’s (1993) position that 
personal investment and strong belief in the correctness of current policies are positively associated 
with CSQ. But findings from Hambrick et al. suggest that CSQ is influenced by whether the firm operates 
in a low or high discretion industry, a notion further advanced by McClelland et al., (2010), who found 
that high CSQ CEOs are associated with better firm performance in low discretion industries and far 
worse performance in high discretion industries. Given that this study’s sample spans a wide variety of 
low, medium, and high discretion industries, it may be necessary to examine firms with similar industry-
level discretion to gain visibility to how performance below aspirations interacts with CSQ. 
Limitations 
While this study builds on previous theory and uses established measures for most constructs, it has 
limitations. First, four psychological traits were measured using CEOs’ responses to questionnaires. 
While McLain (2009) and Hodgkinson (1992) worded items in their scales to reduce confounding 
influences found in psychological scales related and unrelated to management, there is still the potential 
for social desirability bias. CEOs may wish to be perceived as more open to alternative views and 
embracing novel and unclear situations, even if this is contrary to their psychological makeup. The 
method used for measuring cognitive complexity, CEOs reporting the number of functions that they 
have worked in during their careers, is less susceptible to social desirability bias, though there is some 
potential for CEOs to want to be perceived as having experience in more functional areas than they have 
worked. 
Second, the measures of cognitive complexity and CSQ use a single response to proxy for each 
psychological construct. These limitations are the result of the authors’ efforts to achieve a higher 
response rate, which required minimizing the number of items in the questionnaire. A more 
comprehensive scale for cognitive complexity, such as Bieri’s (1966) 100-item scale, might be ideal, but 
would create validity problems due to CEOs’ unwillingness to complete the questionnaire and lack of 
attention span when completing long questionnaires. Thus, the scales and items used in the 
questionnaire represent a compromise between length and depth. Still, in the case of cognitive 
complexity, relying on the number of functions that the CEO has worked during his or her career 
captures his or her functional expertise and skills of evaluating business problems and solutions 
(Dearborn and Simon, 1958; Waller et al., 1995). 
Third, the ability to generalize this study’s findings to other contexts may be limited. As this study uses 
only publicly traded firms based in the United States, the results may not apply to privately held firms, 
family firms, or firms outside the United States. However, because the participating CEOs are from over 
60 different industries, the findings are not constrained to a specific industry. 
Practical implications 
Strategic change is necessary for firms to reverse poor performance or find new sources of competitive 
advantage. As the results from this study suggest, managerial discretion influences when and to what 
degree CEOs implement strategic change. Faced with the same situation, some CEOs will implement 
strategic change to try and improve performance, while others may pursue limited strategic changes or 
delay any change until performance falls far below aspirations. CEOs with higher ambiguity tolerance are 
more likely to implement strategic change early in response to performance downturns, while CEOs with 
greater cognitive complexity are more likely to implement more comprehensive and far-reaching 
strategic change in response to consistently deteriorating performance. With respect to the market for 
managerial talent, executives (and management teams) who are pre-dispositioned to strategically 
maneuver through firm-specific and industry-wide economic downturns will likely have a greater impact 
on future outcomes or, as seen during the financial crisis, perhaps even the viability of the firm itself. A 
board selecting or deciding whether to retain a CEO should emphasize whether the executive’s 
personality profile is appropriate, as this is likely to influence the firm’s strategic change agenda and, in 
turn, the firm’s long-term performance. 
It is the authors’ sincere hope that this study serves to kindle scholarly interest in how managerial 
characteristics influence firm-level strategic behaviors. For example, gender and racially diverse boards 
and top management teams may be associated with greater ambiguity tolerance and cognitive 
complexity, which, in turn, could promote strategic variety and change. These characteristics could also 
serve as moderators between attainment discrepancy and strategic change as diverse upper echelons, 
by their very nature, may attract executives who are more tolerant of ambiguity and have greater 
cognitive complexity. In addition, exploration of how managerial characteristics, such as cognitive 
complexity and ambiguity tolerance, impact other elements of firm strategy (e.g. innovation, 
diversification, acquisitions, competitive aggressiveness) could provide insights to boards regarding 
potential successor CEOs and next generation leaders who may be more likely to undertake the various 
strategic initiatives the board deems essential to firm success. By systematically examining a given firm’s 
human and behavioral capital, it may be possible to glean new insights into the multiple drivers of firm 
initiatives and outcomes. 
Appendix 1 
Table 1A. Ambiguity tolerance item list (from McLain, 2009). 
Item 
 
1. I don’t tolerance ambiguous situations well. 
2. I would rather avoid solving a problem that must be viewed from several different perspectives. 
3. I try to avoid situations that are ambiguous. 
4. I prefer familiar situations to new ones. 
5. Problems that cannot be considered from just one point of view are a little threatening. 
6. I avoid situations that are too complicated for me to easily understand. 
7. I am tolerant of ambiguous situations. 
8. I enjoy tackling problems that are complex enough to be ambiguous. 
9. I try to avoid problems that don’t seem to have only one ‘‘best’’ solution. 
10. I generally prefer novelty over familiarity. 
11. I dislike ambiguous situations. 
12. I find it hard to make a choice when the outcome is uncertain. 
13. I prefer a situation in which there is some ambiguity. 
Note: Items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, and 11 are reverse-scored. 
 
 Appendix 2 
Table 2A. Locus of control item list (from Hodgkinson, 1992). 
Item 
1. There is little my company can do in order to change the ‘‘rules of competition’’ in our industry. 
2. Many of the problems experienced by businesses can be avoided through careful planning and 
analysis. 
3. To a great extent the competitive environment in which my company operates is shaped by 
forces beyond its control. 
4. Becoming a successful company is a matter of creating opportunities, luck has little or nothing 
to do with it. 
5. There is little point in the majority of companies taking an active interest in the wider concerns of 
their industry because only the larger more powerful companies have any real influence. 
6. It is not always wise to make strategic plans far ahead because many things may turn out to be a 
matter of good or bad fortune anyhow. 
7. My company can pretty much accomplish whatever it sets out to achieve. 
8. Most companies can have an influence in shaping the structure of the market. 
9. In regards to competing in the market place, most companies are the victims of forces they 
cannot control. 
10. There is little point in engaging in detailed strategic analyses and planning because often events 
occur that my company cannot control. 
11. Usually companies fail because they have not taken advantage of their opportunities. 
12. My company is able to influence the basis upon which it competes with other firms. 
13. Businesses who rarely experience strategic problems are just plain lucky. 
14. There is a direct connection between the interest you take in your competitors’ businesses and 
the success of your own company. 
15. My company has a direct role in shaping the environment in which it competes. 
16. Market opportunities in my industry are largely predetermined by factors beyond my 
company’s control. 
Note: Items 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, and 15 are reverse-scored. 
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Notes 
1.CEOs were included who were more likely to be familiar with or personally connected to the home 
university of one of the authors. A 750-mile radius from that author’s home university to firms’ 
headquarters was necessary to create a mailing list of CEOs from at least 1000 firms. This 
methodology is consistent with previous research showing that response rates can be increased 
when targeted respondents have a personal or geographic affinity to the researcher’s institution 
(Knight et al., 1999). While the generalizability of any sample population is limited, prior 
research supports the position that proximity does not limit the ability to generalize results for 
the entire set of public firms in the United States (Smith et al., 1994). 
2.See Finkelstein (1992) for the list of elite educational institutions. 
References  
Aldrich, H (2008) Organizations and Environments. CA: Stanford University Press.  
Anderson, CR, Schneier, CE (1978) Locus of control, leader behavior and leader performance among 
management students. Academy of Management Journal 21(4): 690–698.  
Andrews, KR (1971) The Concept of Corporate Strategy. Homewood: RD Irwin Inc.  
Ashill, NJ, Jobber, D (2013) The effects of experience on managerial decision-making uncertainty. 
Journal of General Management 39(1): 81–110.  
Audia, PG, Greve, HR (2006) Less likely to fail: low performance, firm size, and factory expansion in 
the shipbuilding industry. Management Science 52(1): 83–94.  
Barker, VL, Duhaime, IM (1997) Strategic change in the turnaround process: theory and empirical 
evidence. Strategic Management Journal 18(1): 13–38.  
Baum, JA, Rowley, TJ, Shipilov, AV. (2005) Dancing with strangers: aspiration performance and the 
search for underwriting syndicate partners. Administrative Science Quarterly 50(4): 536–575.  
Bieri, J (1966) Cognitive complexity and personality development. In: Harvey, OJ (ed) Experience 
Structure and Adaptability. Berlin: Springer, pp. 13–37.  
Bogner, WC, Barr, PS (2000) Making sense in hypercompetitive environments: a cognitive 
explanation for the persistence of high velocity competition. Organization Science 
11(2): 212–226.  
Bonn, I (2005) Improving strategic thinking: a multilevel approach. Leadership and Organization 
Development Journal 26(5): 336–354.  
Boone, C, Brabander, B, Witteloostuijn, A (1996) CEO locus of control and small firm performance: 
an integrative framework and empirical test. Journal of Management Studies 33(5): 667–700.  
Bromiley, P (1991) Testing a causal model of corporate risk taking and performance. Academy of 
Management Journal 34(1): 37–59.  
Bromiley, P (2005) The behavioural foundations of strategic management. International Journal of 
Leadership in Public Services 1(1): 56–57.  
Budner, S (1962) Intolerance of ambiguity as a personality variable. Journal of Personality 
30(1): 31–50.  
Carpenter, MA (2000) The price of change: the role of CEO compensation in strategic variation and 
deviation from industry strategy norms. Journal of Management 26(6): 1179–1198.  
Carpenter, MA (2002) The implications of strategy and social context for the relationship between 
top management team heterogeneity and firm performance. Strategic Management Journal 
23(3): 275–284.  
Crossland, C, Zyung, J, Hiller, N. (2014) CEO career variety: effects on firm-level strategic and social 
novelty. Academy of Management Journal 57(3): 652–674.  
Cyert, RM, March, JG (1963) A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.  
Datta, DK (1991) Organizational fit and acquisition performance: effects of post-acquisition 
integration. Strategic Management Journal 12(4): 281–297.  
Dearborn, DWC, Simon, HA (1958) Selective perception: a note on the departmental identifications 
of executives. Sociometry 21(2): 140–144.  
Dess, GG, Beard, DW (1984) Dimensions of organizational task environments. Administrative 
Science Quarterly 29(1): 52–73. 
 
Drummond, H (2015) How the hell could that happen?! A symbolic perspective on disaster. Journal 
of General Management 40(4): 3–21.  
Finkelstein, S (1992) Power in top management teams: dimensions, measurement, and validation. 
Academy of Management Journal 35(3): 505–538.  
Finkelstein, S, Hambrick, D, Cannella, A (2009) Strategic Leadership: Theory and Research on 
Executives, Top Management Teams, and Boards. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
Fiske, ST, Taylor, SE (2013) Social Cognition: From Brains to Culture. London: Sage.  
Frenkel-Brunswik, E (1949) Intolerance of ambiguity as an emotional and perceptual personality 
variable. Journal of Personality 18(1): 108–143.  
Furnham, A, Marks, J (2013) Tolerance of ambiguity: a review of the recent literature. Psychology 
4(09): 717–728.  
Gavetti, G, Levinthal, D, Ocasio, W (2007) Perspective neo-Carnegie: the Carnegie school’s past, 
present, and reconstructing for the future. Organization Science 18(3): 523–536.  
Geletkanycz, MA, Black, SS (2001) Bound by the past? Experience-based effects on commitment to 
the strategic status quo. Journal of Management 27(1): 3–21.  
Graetz, F (2002) Strategic thinking versus strategic planning: towards understanding the 
complementarities. Management Decision 40(5): 456–462.  
Greve, HR (2003) A behavioral theory of R&D expenditures and innovations: evidence from 
shipbuilding. Academy of Management Journal 46(6): 685–702.  
Halbesleben, JR, Novicevic, MM, Harvey, MG. (2003) Awareness of temporal complexity in 
leadership of creativity and innovation: a competency-based model. The Leadership 
Quarterly 14(4): 433–454.  
Hambrick, DC (2007) Upper echelons theory: an update. Academy of Management Review 
32(2): 334–343.  
Hambrick, DC, Abrahamson, E (1995) Assessing managerial discretion across industries: a 
multimethod approach. Academy of Management Journal 38(5): 1427–1441.  
Hambrick, DC, Cho, TS, Chen, MJ (1996) The influence of top management team heterogeneity on 
firms’ competitive moves. Administrative Science Quarterly 41(4): 659–684.  
Hambrick, DC, Finkelstein, S (1987) Managerial discretion: a bridge between polar views of 
organizational outcomes. Research in Organizational Behavior 9: 396–406.  
Hambrick, DC, Finkelstein, S, Mooney, AC (2005) Executive job demands: new insights for 
explaining strategic decisions and leader behaviors. Academy of Management Review 
30(3): 472–491.  
Hambrick, DC, Geletkanycz, MA, Fredrickson, JW (1993) Top executive commitment to the status 
quo: some tests of its determinants. Strategic Management Journal 14(6): 401–418.  
Hambrick, DC, Macmillan, IC (1985) Efficiency of product R&D in business units: the role of strategic 
context. Academy of Management Journal 28(3): 527–547.  
Hambrick, DC, Mason, PA (1984). Upper echelons: the organization as a reflection of its top 
managers. Academy of Management Review 9(2): 193–206.  
Hannan, MT, Freeman, J (1977) The population ecology of organizations. American Journal of 
Sociology 82(5): 929–964.  
Hiller, NJ, Hambrick, DC (2005) Conceptualizing executive hubris: the role of (hyper-) core self-
evaluations in strategic decision-making. Strategic Management Journal 26(4): 297–319.  
Hitt, MA, Tyler, BB (1991) Strategic decision models: integrating different perspectives. Strategic 
Management Journal 12(5): 327–351.  
Hodgkinson, GP (1992) Research notes and communications development and validation of the 
strategic locus of control scale. Strategic Management Journal 13(4): 311–317. 
 
Hogarth, R (1980) Judgment and Choice: The Psychology of Decision Processes. New York: Wiley.  
Howell, JM, Avolio, BJ (1993) Transformational leadership, transactional leadership, locus of 
control, and support for innovation: Key predictors of consolidated-business-unit 
performance. Journal of Applied Psychology 78(6): 891–902.  
Iyer, DN, Miller, KD (2008) Performance feedback, slack, and the timing of acquisitions. Academy of 
Management Journal 51(4): 808–822.  
Judge, TA, Piccolo, RF, Kosalka, T (2009) The bright and dark sides of leader traits: a review and 
theoretical extension of the leader trait paradigm. The Leadership Quarterly 20(6): 855–875.  
Judge, TA, Thoresen, CJ, Pucik, V. (1999) Managerial coping with organizational change: a 
dispositional perspective. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84(1): 107–122.  
Key, S (2002) Perceived managerial discretion: an analysis of individual ethical intentions. Journal of 
Managerial Issues 14(2): 218–233.  
Knight, D, Pearce, CL, Smith, KG. (1999) Top management team diversity, group process, and 
strategic consensus. Strategic Management Journal 20(5): 445–465.  
Kuusela, P, Keil, T, Maula, M (2017). Driven by aspirations, but in what direction? Performance 
shortfalls, slack resources, and resource-consuming vs. resource-freeing organizational 
change. Strategic Management Journal 38(5): 1101–1120.  
Latukha, MO, Panibratov, AY (2015) Top management teams’ competencies for international 
operations: Do they influence a firm’s result? Journal of General Management 40(4): 45–69.  
Lawrence, BS (1997) Perspective—The black box of organizational demography. Organization 
Science 8(1): 1–22.  
Levenson, H (1974) Activism and powerful others: distinctions within the concept of internal-
external control. Journal of Personality Assessment 38(4): 377–383.  
Levinthal, DA, March, JG (1993) The myopia of learning. Strategic Management Journal 14(S2): 95–
112.  
Levitt, B, March, JG (1988) Organizational learning. Annual Review of Sociology 14(1): 319–338.  
Lim, ENK, McCann, BT (2014) Performance feedback and firm risk taking: the moderating effects of 
CEO and outside director stock options. Organization Science 25(1): 262–282.  
March, JG, Simon, HA (1958) Organizations. Oxford, UK: Wiley.  
McClelland, PL, Liang, X, Barker, VL (2010) CEO commitment to the status quo: replication and 
extension using content analysis. Journal of Management 36(5): 1251–1277.  
McGill, AR, Johnson, MD, Bantel, KA (1994) Cognitive complexity and conformity: effects on 
performance in a turbulent environment. Psychological Reports 75(3f): 1451–1472.  
McLain, DL (2009) Evidence of the properties of an ambiguity tolerance measure: The multiple 
stimulus types ambiguity tolerance scale-ii (MSTAT-ii) 1. Psychological Reports 105(3): 975–
988.  
Miller, D (1991) Stale in the saddle: CEO tenure and the match between organization and 
environment. Management Science 37(1): 34–52.  
Miller, D, Chen, MJ (1994). Sources and consequences of competitive inertia: a study of the US 
airline industry. Administrative Science Quarterly 39(1): 1–23.  
Miller, D, Kets De Vries, MFR, Toulouse, J-M (1982) Top executive locus of control and its 
relationship to strategy-making, structure, and environment. Academy of Management 
Journal 25(2): 237–253.  
Mintzberg, H (1978) Patterns in strategy formation. Management Science 24(9): 934–948.  
Musteen, M, Barker, VL, Baeten, VL (2006) CEO attributes associated with attitude toward change: 
the direct and moderating effects of CEO tenure. Journal of Business Research 59(5): 604–
612. 
 
Nakauchi, M, Wiersema, MF (2015) Executive succession and strategic change in Japan. Strategic 
Management Journal 36(2): 298–306.  
Neuliep, JW, Hazelton, V (1986) Enhanced conversational recall and reduced conversational 
interference as a function of cognitive complexity. Human Communication Research 
13(2): 211–224.  
Oreg, S (2003) Resistance to change: developing an individual differences measure. Journal of 
Applied Psychology 88(4): 680–693.  
Porter, ME (1980) Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors. New 
York, NY: The Free Press.  
Ref, O, Shapira, Z (2017) Entering new markets: the effect of performance feedback near aspiration 
and well below and above it. Strategic Management Journal 38(7): 1416–1434.  
Roberts, BW, Walton, KE, Viechtbauer, W (2006) Patterns of mean-level change in personality traits 
across the life course: a meta-analysis of longitudinal studies. Psychological Bulletin 
132(1): 1–25.  
Rotter, JB (1966) Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. 
Psychological Monographs: General and Applied 80(1): 1–28.  
Rousseeuw, PJ, Leroy, AM (2005) Robust Regression and Outlier Detection. New York: John Wiley 
and Sons.  
Shapira, Z (2017) Entering new markets: the effect of performance feedback near aspiration and 
well below and above it. Strategic Management Journal 38(7): 1416–1434.  
Shipilov, AV, Li, SX, Greve, HR (2011) The prince and the pauper: search and brokerage in the 
initiation of status-heterophilous ties. Organization Science 22(6): 1418–1434.  
Smith, KG, Smith, KA, Olian, JD. (1994) Top management team demography and process: the role of 
social integration and communication. Administrative Science Quarterly 39(3): 412–438.  
Starbuck, WH, Milliken, FJ (1988) Executives’ perceptual filters: What they notice and how they 
make sense. In: Hambrick, D (ed) The Executive Effect: Concepts and Methods for Studying 
Top Managers. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, pp. 35–65.  
Thompson, JD (1967) Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory. New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.  
Tushman, ML, Newman, WH, Romanelli, E (1986) Convergence and upheaval: managing the 
unsteady pace of organizational evolution. California Management Review 29(1): 29–44.  
Van Seggelen-Damen, IC (2013) Reflective personality: identifying cognitive style and cognitive 
complexity. Current Psychology 32(1): 82–99.  
Waller, MJ, Huber, GP, Glick, WH (1995) Functional background as a determinant of executives’ 
selective perception. Academy of Management Journal 38(4): 943–974.  
Wally, S, Baum, JR (1994) Personal and structural determinants of the pace of strategic decision 
making. Academy of Management Journal 37(4): 932–956.  
Wangrow, DB, Schepker, DJ, Barker, VL (2015) Managerial discretion: an empirical review and focus 
on future research directions. Journal of Management 41(1): 99–135.  
Wiklund, J, Shepherd, D (2003) Aspiring for, and achieving growth: the moderating role of 
resources and opportunities. Journal of Management Studies 40(8): 1919–1941.  
Zander, U, Kogut, B (1995) Knowledge and the speed of the transfer and imitation of organizational 
capabilities: an empirical test. Organization Science 6(1): 76–92.  
 
 
